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Domestic Abuse: Instrumental Violence 





A large fraction of domestically abused women report that their partners interfere with their 
participation in education and employment. As of yet, mainstream economics has not dealt in 
any systematic way with this phenomenon and its implications for welfare policy. This paper 
puts  forward  a  theoretical  framework  that  rationalizes  why  men  may  use  violence 
“instrumentally” to prevent their partners from entering employment or from increasing hours 
of work. The model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and 
domestic violence. We explore the implication of this result in the context of various welfare 
policies. There are unlikely to be any magic bullets or one-size-fit-all solutions when it comes 
to reducing the incidence of domestic violence. Instead, specific measures and incentives may 
have to be targeted at different types of households. 
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Protection 2011. 1. Introduction
Domestic violence is an everyday occurrence throughout the world. There is a clear gender
pattern in that women more often suﬀer abuse, and abuse that is of a severe physical type. Data
from around the world suggest that 20 - 60 percent of women experience domestic violence at
some stage in their lives (World Health Organization, 1996). The costs of domestic violence are
substantial and can be divided into four categories (Buvinic et al, 1999). First, direct costs include
the value of goods and services used in treating or preventing domestic violence.1 Second, non-
monetary costs arise from increased mortality through suicide, abuse of alcohol and drugs, and
from depressive disorders. Third, economic multiplier eﬀects result from decreased female labor
participation, increased absenteeism, and reduced productivity at work. Lastly, social multiplier
eﬀects follow from the impact of domestic violence on children and the erosion of social capital.
A growing literature has considered domestic violence from an economic theory perspective.
The main theories that have been put forward or used in the recent economic literature can be
broadly placed into three categories: “exchange theory”, “signaling theory”, and “cue-triggered
theory”. Exchange theory (Tauchen et al., 1991; Farmer and Thiefenthaler, 1997; Aizer, 2010)
posits that some males have a preferences for inﬂicting pain or injury onto their female partners,
and emphasizes Pareto-eﬃcient intra-household bargains whereby husbands eﬀectively bribe their
wives into accepting some level of violence by oﬀering side payments in return.2 Thus, acts of
violence may become part of a Pareto-improving trade between spouses.3 The key prediction of
exchange theories is that increasing a woman’s relative wage increases her bargaining power and
monotonically decreases the level of violence by improving her outside option. In signaling theory
(Bloch and Rao, 2002), a male’s “satisfaction” with his marriage is private information. While
satisﬁed husbands would never engage in violence, dissatisﬁed husbands have less aversion towards
using violence and may do so in order to signal their dissatisfaction, thereby extracting transfers
from the wife’s family. In the behavioral “cue-triggered theory” (Card and Dahl, 2011), males
may fundamentally have a preference against being abusive but may become violent as a result of
“losing control” in response to some negative cues, the exposure to which they control in order to
maximize their own ex ante utility.
In this paper, we put forward an alternative theory of domestic violence. Our aim is to show
how economic incentives for domestic violence may emerge endogenously from the internal orga-
nization of the family. The theory we present is predicated on the idea that violent households
are characterized by spousal disagreements regarding their respective economic roles, modeled here
as having its root cause in the time allocated to the provision of family-speciﬁc public goods. To
this eﬀect, we present a model which depicts family behavior as a noncooperative game. How-
ever, we also assume that partners have caring preferences, which implies that, for couples with
“near complete caring”, equilibrium behavior is nearly “completely cooperative”. Hence the car-
ing parameter eﬀectively parameterizes the degree of noncooperation. In the model, each partner
1Estimates for the United States suggest that the direct service-related costs of domestic violence range between
$5 and $10 billion annually (Laurence and Spalter-Roth, 1996).
2“Exchange theory” originates from sociology and is, in the context of domestic violence, associated with the work
of Gelles (1974). The central premise of exchange theory is that humans are dependent on one another for outcomes
that they value. Actors are self-interested, and social relations are formed and maintained because actors provide
reciprocal beneﬁts.
3In particular, equilibrium violence occurs in these models if and only if the man values the ﬁrst unit of violence
more than the woman dislikes it (see e.g. p. 1 in online Appendix to Aizer, 2010)
2derives utility from own private consumption and from a household public good which is produced
using time-inputs by both partners. In the noncooperative equilibrium, spouses do not provide
the eﬃcient level of the family public good, and each partner would like the other to work less in
the labor market and to contribute more time to household production activities. We allow for
transfers between the partners. Transfers serve two purposes. First, a partner may use a transfer
to support the other’s consumption. Second, a transfer by one partner may also serve the purpose
of gaining some control over the other’s time allocation.
The only gender asymmetry in the model is that men are assumed—e.g., due to superior physical
strength—to have the option of exercising violence. Violence in our model is an instrumental
activity that is directly targeted at women’s labor market opportunities. This modeling approach
is motivated by the observation, outlined below, that abusive males routinely target their partner’s
labor market activities. In particular, we will identify instrumental incentives for violence with the
husband’s equilibrium utility being locally decreasing in the wife’s earnings capacity. We assume
that, by exercising violence, the husband can damage his partner’s earnings capacity through tactics
involving targeted physical and emotional abuse as well as direct interference with work eﬀorts.
We obtain three main sets of results. First, we derive and analyze the set of parameter values
under which domestic violence emerges as instrumental equilibrium behavior. A key result is that
the husband’s incentives for abuse are eﬀectively inversely U-shaped in the wife’s relative wage.
On the one hand, when the wife has a very low wage relative to the husband, he supports her
ﬁnancially through a monetary transfer and she will voluntarily specialize completely in household
production. Since the wife’s post-transfer time allocation choice coincides with her partner’s pre-
ferred outcome, the relationship stays violence-free. On the other hand, when the wife has a very
high wage relative to the husband, her labor market income is too important for the household for
him to sabotage her earnings capacity. Instead, incentives for abuse obtain when her relative wage
is at an intermediate level. In this case, it is individually rational for the wife to enter employment,
but the husband’s preferred choice is for her to stay specialized at household production. The
husband attempts to shift the woman’s employment choice towards his preferred specialization
outcome through his monetary transfer. However, from the perspective of the husband, he would
be better oﬀ is her wage was lower, thus giving him an incentive to resort to violence. Hence the
model eﬀectively predicts that abuse is associated with the wife’s labor supply being contentious
and economic roles in the family “hanging in the balance”. Second, we demonstrate that violence
will not occur among couples’ whose behavior is characterized by complete cooperation. In the cur-
rent framework, equilibrium violence requires some degree of noncooperation between partners and
is ultimately triggered by the misalignment of spousal preferences regarding the intra-household
allocation of time. Even though this result should not come as a surprise, it underscores the diﬀer-
ence between our approach and economic exchange theories of domestic where violence may obtain
under complete cooperation between spouses. Third, our framework serves to highlight some policy
dilemmas as it allows us to think about the consequences of welfare reform. We show that various
welfare policies (e.g., unconditional family cash beneﬁts) aimed universally at all households shift
the incidence of domestic violence without necessarily reducing it. In order to reduce violence,
diﬀerent types of households have to be targeted with diﬀerent types of instruments.
Central to our model is the notion of violence by males being “instrumental” and directly
related to women’s economic activity.4 The notion that abusive males target their partners’ work
(or schooling) eﬀorts is well-documented in the literature (Raphael 1995, 1996). Sabotage tactics
4The term “instrumental violence” was introduced by Gelles and Strass (1979) to refer to “...the use of pain or
3used by abusive males noted in the literature include the inﬂicting of visible facial injuries before
job interviews, destruction of homework assignments, keeping women up all night with arguments
and ﬁghts before key tests or job interviews, turning oﬀ alarm clocks, destroying or hiding clothes,
cutting oﬀ the victim’s hair to cause embarrassment, threatening to kidnap the children from child
care centers, failing to show up as promised for child care or transportation, job-related stalking
and on-the-job harassment (Tjadden and Thoennes, 1998; Zachary, 2000; Swanberg and Macke,
2006).
Interference with work eﬀort by abusive males appears to be commonplace.5 Tolman and
Rosen (2001) in a study of 753 female welfare recipients in Michigan document that 48 percent of
those who had experienced severe violence in the preceding 12 months also reported some form of
direct work interference. Similarly, in a study of 1,082 applicants for public assistance in Colorado,
Pearson et. al (1999) found that 44 percent of domestic violence victims reported that their abusive
partners had prevented them from working. It is well understood that exposure to domestic violence
has major implications for victimized employees. The short-term consequences include increased
absenteeism and reduced productivity (Swanberg and Macke, 2006). Hence, hourly earnings may
be aﬀected. Domestic violence also negatively and signiﬁcantly aﬀects the victim’s capacity to
maintain work in the long-term (Browne et al., 1999). As a consequence, potential employers may
become sceptical of a victimized woman’s inconsistent work history, making it diﬃcult for her to
ﬁnd new employment.
Our approach to modeling domestic violence entails characterizing family decision-making as
non-cooperative.6 We advocate this approach even through the dominant premise in the theory of
the family is that households are able to reach eﬃcient outcomes (Becker 1991; Manser and Brown,
1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Chiappori, 1992; Chiappori et al., 2002). Indeed, in our setting,
households will reach (near) eﬃcient outcomes if their caring is (nearly) complete. Complete or
near complete caring may well characterize a large proportion of existing couples, thus implying
that assuming eﬃciency is a reasonable ﬁrst approximation of typical household behaviour in other
settings. It does not, however, imply that assuming eﬃciency is a useful approach to modeling the
behavior among couples engaging in domestic violence.7 The key point that we would stress here
is an obvious one, namely that the idea that violent behavior is eﬃcient and welfare enhancing
is at odds with the common-sense view that domestic violence is a harmful activity that society
should try to prevent.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we set out our model of domestic violence, discuss
our assumptions, and analyze the equilibrium of the model. We then in Section 3 investigate policy.
The main focus here will be to show that welfare policies shift the incidence of domestic violence in
predictable ways. Section 4 provides a simple Cobb-Douglas example which illustrates our results.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the empirical relevance of our results and some pointers
injury as a punishment to induce another person to carry out some act” (p. 557). In contrast “expressive violence”
refers to “...the use of physical force to cause pain or injury as an end in itself” (p. 557), i.e. preference based,
possibly in the context of loss of control.
5Indeed, the so-called Work/School Abuse Scale (W/SAS) survey instrument was constructed to measure such
interference with employment and education by abusive males (Riger et al., 2000).
6Various kinds of non-cooperative models have been put forward in the literature, e.g. by Bergstrom, 1989;
Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Konrad and Lommerund, 1995; Chen and Woolley, 2001; and Anderberg, 2007.
7Models of (expressive) domestic violence which imply eﬃcient outcomes, either by directly assuming cooperative
bargaining or via the Coase theorem, include those presented by Tauchen et al. (1991), Farmer and Thiefenthaler
(1997) and, recently, Aizer (2010).
4for future research.
2. The Model
2.1. The Formal Setup
Consider an economy consisting of households, where, in each household, there is a husband
(h) and a wife (s). Each partner i (i = h,s) obtains utility from private consumption, ci, and a
home-produced household public good, Q. For simplicity we assume separable preferences with a
common utility function over the household public good. Formally, let the preferences of partner
i be represented by
ui(ci,Q) = vi(ci) + Z(Q), (1)
where vi is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and limci→∞ v′
i(ci) =
0 and limci→0 v′
i(ci) = ∞. Each spouse has a unit of active time endowment, to be allocated be-
tween market work, ℓi, and home production, qi ≡ 1 − ℓi. We denote the household production
function by Q = Q(qh,qs). The properties of Z( ) and Q( , ) are discussed below.
We assume “caring preferences”: each partner puts a weight of   ∈ (0,1/2) on the private
utility of the spouse and a (larger) weight (1 −  ) on own private utility. The total preferences of
partner i are thus
Ui(ci,c−i,Q) = (1 −  )ui(ci,Q) +  u−i(c−i,Q). (2)
Note that the limit as   approaches one-half corresponds to a situation of full cooperation. In
this case, the partners pursue the same objectives and hence will operate on the Pareto frontier.
Conversely, the limit as   approaches zero corresponds to f situation of pure noncooperation. Our
model, therefore, also allows consideration of how the incidence of domestic violence varies with
the degree of (non)cooperation within a partnership.
When working in the labor market, partner i can earn a wage wi ∈ Wi ≡ [wi,wi], i = h,s.
We will refer to the wage proﬁle (wh,ws) as a couple’s “type” and assume that couple-types are
distributed according to some continuous distribution G on the support Wh × Ws (with positive
density on the entire support).
The model also allows for unearned income yi. However, for the baseline scenario, we assume
yi = 0. Positive unearned income will be considered in the context of welfare policy in Section 3.
Finally, partner i can make a transfer ti ≥ 0 to the spouse, and we let t ≡ th − ts denote the net
transfer from the husband to the wife.
By substituting for ui and Q in (2), individual i’s total preferences can be written as
Ui(ci,c−i,ℓi,ℓ−i) = (1 −  )vi(ci) +  v−i(c−i) + z(1 − ℓh,1 − ℓs), (3)
where z(qh,qs) ≡ Z(Q(qh,qs)) is the composition of the utility from Q with the household produc-
tion function. We assume that the partners’ time inputs into household production are “indepen-
dent”:
Assumption 1 (Household Production Technology). The composite function z (qh,qs) is additively
separable,
z (qh,qs) = zh (qh) + zs (qs),
with each zi ( ) being twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave and
with limqi→0 z′
i (qi) = ∞ (i = h,s).
5We adopt the following timing of events. First, the husband chooses whether or not to exercise
domestic violence. Second, the spouses simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose transfers.
Finally, the spouses simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide on how to allocate their unit
time endowment between market work and the production of the household public good. The
analysis that follows deals with the choices of the two family members in reverse order.
We assume complete information. In particular, the values of all the parameters are common
knowledge between the two partners. The only fundamental gender asymmetry in our model is
thus with respect to the husband’s ability to use violence. Violence has an investment ﬂavor in
that it has a lasting adverse eﬀect on the victim’s earnings potential. Indeed, a positive level of
domestic violence works to reduce the market wage of the wife. Since domestic violence interferes
with the victim’s potential wage in the labor market, it may be thought of as purposeful behavior
by the husband to achieving some control over the time allocation of the wife.
2.2. The Time Allocation
Taking unearned incomes, transfers and the spouse’s time allocation as given, partner i solves
max
ℓi∈[0,1]
{Ui (ci,c−i,ℓi,ℓ−i)|ci = wiℓi + Yi}, (4)
where
Yi ≡ yi − ti + t−i. (5)
The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior optimum reads
(1 −  )v′
i(wiℓi + Yi)wi ≤ z′
i(1 − ℓi). (6)
Note that (6), which will hold with equality when ℓi > 0 and with inequality when ℓi = 0, only
involves the “own” wage and unearned income. Thus, each partner has a strictly dominant time
allocation strategy, which we denote ℓi (wi,Yi). By Assumption 1, we can be sure that neither
partner will fully specialize in market work.
In general, the eﬀect of i’s own wage on ℓi is ambiguous due to conﬂicting income and substi-
tution eﬀects. We will assume, however, that the substitution eﬀect dominates so that individual
i’s labor supply is non-decreasing in the own wage. This assumption captures the idea that the
husband can reduce the wife’s formal labour supply by interfering with her earnings capacity.
Assumption 2 (Eﬀect of Own Wage on Labor Supply). The substitution eﬀect dominates the
income eﬀect so that individual i’s labor supply is non-decreasing in her own wage:
∂ℓi (wi,Yi)
∂wi
≥ 0 for i = h,s.






for i = h,s, (7)
which, by Assumption 2, is also positive. We deﬁne the individual’s earnings function as
mi (wi,Yi) ≡ wiℓi (wi,Yi) for i = h,s. (8)




This follows immediately from the fact that, with separable preferences, the individual’s consump-
tion must be increasing in Yi. The fact that partner i’s earnings are decreasing in Yi reﬂect that
his/her labor supply is decreasing in Yi. Looking ahead towards the transfer decisions, this implies
that each partner i can induce the other to reduce his/her labor supply by increasing the transfer
ti.
It is also straightforward to demonstrate that partner i’s labor supply is decreasing in the caring
parameter  . This follows from the fact that, at any   < 1/2, there is an ineﬃciency in the chosen
labor supplies. In particular, each partner works “too much” from the perspective of the spouse.
To see this, note that partner i values an increase in earnings of partner −i at  v′
−i (c−i) whereas
partner −i values it more highly at (1 −  )v′
−i (c−i). The closer   is to one-half, the more each
partner “internalizes” this eﬀect and hence chooses a lower level of market work.
We will also make a set of further assumptions which we impose directly on the labor supply
functions rather than on the primitives as the corresponding assumptions on the primitives would
be highly involved and contain diﬃcult-to-interpret third derivatives of v ( ) and z ( ).
Assumption 3 (Second Derivatives of Labor Supply).























Part (i), which is equivalent to earnings being a weakly convex function of unearned income, is
used below to demonstrate that, if one partner is making a transfer to the other, then the donor’s
utility is a concave function of the transfer. Many common utility speciﬁcations, including the
Cobb-Douglas and CES case (see below), satisfy this assumption through ℓi (wi,Yi) being linear in
Yi.
Part (ii) is equivalent to the cross-partial of the earnings function m(w,Y ) being non-negative.
This assumption is a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for the transfer given from partner
i to −i being decreasing in the recipient’s wage when the recipient is working. This condition
is satisﬁed with equality in the Cobb-Douglas case and holds in the CES case if and only if the
elasticity of substitution exceeds unity.
Part (iii) says that the individual’s labour supply is a suﬃciently concave function of the wage.
7The particular assumption is equivalent to the wage elasticity εi (wi,Yi) being decreasing in wi.8
This is used below to argue that the husband’s incentives for violence eventually diminish as the
wife’s wage grows. The assumption is satisﬁed by Cobb-Douglas and CES preferences whenever
Yi ≥ 0. Taken together, the assumptions also imply that the elasticity εi (wi,Yi) is increasing in
unearned income.9
2.3. The Transfer Decision
Each partner has two potential motives for transferring income to the spouse. First, to support
the spouse’s consumption. Second, to induce the spouse to work less in the labor market. We will
characterize here the transfer ti from partner i to the spouse −i under the assumption that −i is
not making any transfer back, i.e. that t−i = 0. Below we will verify that, indeed, in equilibrium
at most one partner will be making a positive transfer.
We will demonstrate that partner i’s choice of ti, when viewed as a function of the spouse’s
wage w−i, has four “regimes”. First, in the low-wage regime, partner i makes a pure “benevolent
transfer”, denoted t0
i(wi,w−i), and −i strictly prefers not to work. Second, in the low-to-medium
wage regime, partner i makes a “crowding out” transfer, denoted t1
i(wi,w−i), and −i just prefers
not to work. Third, in the medium-to-high wage regime, partner i makes a positive transfer,
denoted t2
i(wi,w−i), and −i works some strictly positive amount of time. Finally, in high wage
regime, partner i does not make a transfer and −i works some strictly positive amount of time.
The following proposition formalizes partner i’s transfer behavior:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Transfer Choices). For given wi > 0 there exist three critical wages
for the spouse, wk
−i(wi),k = 0,1,2, ranked increasingly in k and each strictly increasing in wi, such
that:
1. When w−i < w0
−i(wi), partner i makes a (“benevolent”) transfer t∗
i = t0
i(wi,w−i), which
is strictly increasing in wi and independent of w−i, and −i (strictly) fully specializes in
household production, ℓ∗
−i = 0.
2. When w−i ∈ [w0
−i(wi),w1
−i(wi)], partner i makes a (“crowding-out”) transfer t∗
i = t1
i(wi,w−i),
which is independent of wi and strictly increasing in w−i, and −i (just) fully specializes in
household production, ℓ∗
−i = 0.
3. When w−i ∈ [w1
−i(wi),w2
−i(wi)], partner i makes an (“interior”) transfer t∗
i = t2
i(wi,w−i),
which is strictly increasing in wi and strictly decreasing w−i, and −i works positive hours,
ℓ∗
−i > 0.
4. When w−i ≥ w2
−i(wi), partner i makes no transfer t∗
i = 0, and −i works positive hours,
ℓ∗
−i > 0.
The benevolent transfer t0
i (wi,w−i) equalizes the marginal utility of each partner’s consumption
as viewed from the perspective of i’s preferences under the assumption that the spouse has no
earnings,
(1 −  )v′
i(ci) =  v′
−i(c−i). (10)




































which is positive due to the cross-partial of













Figure 1: The transfer made by partner i as a function of the spouse’s wage
This is an equilibrium when the spouse chooses not to work when provided with the benevolent
transfer. Indeed, the ﬁrst critical wage, w0
−i(wi), is deﬁned as the highest w−i at which −i prefers
not to work upon receiving t0
i (wi,w−i).
Whenever w−i > w0
−i(wi), −i would choose to work some strictly positive hours if provided
with t0
i (wi,w−i). For a range of w−i, up to a second critical wage w1
−i(wi), partner i then increases
the transfer ti so as to (just) ensure that the spouse chooses not to work. Thus, the “crowding
out” transfer t1
i (wi,w−i) is characterized by the ﬁrst order condition for −i’s labor supply (6)
holding with equality at ℓ−i = 0. As an increase in w−i strengthens −i’s labor supply incentives, it
also increases t1
i (wi,w−i). As the spouse’s wage increases further, it eventually no longer becomes
optimal for partner i to completely crowd out the spouse’s labor supply. However, the transfer
chosen by partner i even in this case will be aimed in part at reducing the spouse’s labor supply.
The ﬁrst order condition characterizing the “interior” t2
i(wi,w−i) transfer is
(1 −  )v′
i (ci) = v′
−i (c−i)
￿






i(wi,w−i) contains both a benevolent aspect and a labor supply reducing aspect. The
two remaining critical wages, w1
−i(wi) and w2
−i(wi), are characterized by the recipient’s labor
supply at the interior transfer going down to zero and the interior transfer itself going down to
zero, respectively.
Figure 1 illustrates the transfer made by partner i as a function of the spouse’s wage w−i for a
given own wage wi. Note in particular how the transfer is a non-monotonic function of w−i.
The hatched line in Figure 1 shows the eﬀect of an increase in the own wage wi. From Propo-
sition 1 we know that an increase in wi increases both the benevolent transfer t0
i(wi,w−i) and the
9interior transfer t2
i(wi,w−i) which in turn increases all three critical wages, wk
−i(wi),k = 0,1,2.
As the ﬁgure illustrates, this implies that the equilibrium transfer made by partner i, denoted
t∗
i (wi,w−i) is (weakly) increasing in the own wage wi.
Lemma 1 (Eﬀect of Own Wage on Transfers). The equilibrium transfer t∗
i(wi,w−i) > 0 is weakly
increasing in wi.
In characterizing the transfer made by partner i we have assumed that no simultaneous transfer
was made from the spouse back to partner i. This can be easily veriﬁed.
Lemma 2 (No Simultaneous Transfers). If partner i makes a positive equilibrium transfer, t∗
i (wi,w−i) >
0, then the spouse −i strictly prefers not to make a transfer, t∗
−i (w−i,wi) = 0.
Indeed, the proof of Lemma 2 demonstrates that, for any given wi there will exist a range
of spousal wages w−i such that both i and −i choose not to make any transfer in equilibrium.
Hence in a population of couples with a distribution of wage-proﬁle types, equilibrium transfers
will be zero for a positive measure of couples. In the limiting case of complete caring (  = 1/2)
the measure of couples who make no transfers reduces to zero as, in the limit, the partners agree
on the consumption allocation and this allocation will, generically, not coincide with the partners’
income proﬁle.
To summarize, if one partner makes an equilibrium transfer to the spouse, he/she does so
to support the spouse’s private consumption and to inﬂuence the spouse’s time allocation away
from market work. We now ask whether and when the husband has an incentive to resort to an
additional means of inﬂuence, namely instrumental violence.
2.4. Incentives for Domestic Violence
We identify economic incentives for instrumental violence with the husband’s equilibrium utility
being locally decreasing in the wife’s earnings capacity. The following result, which is interpreted
after its statement, reveals that the risk of domestic violence is present when the economic roles
within the partnership, in a sense, “hang in the balance”.
Proposition 2 (Economic Incentives for Instrumental Violence). For a given wh there exists a
critical wage w∗
s (wh) such that the husband has an equilibrium incentive for instrumental violence
when ws ∈ (w0
s(wh),w∗
s(wh)). The critical wage w∗
s (wh) strictly exceeds w1
s (wh) and is weakly
increasing in wh.
The proposition states that the husband’s economic incentives for abuse kick in when his
benevolent transfer is not suﬃcient to induce the wife to fully specialize in household production,
i.e. when ws > w0
s(wh), and it continues up to some level of the wife’s wage at which she is working
in equilibrium. The result has a simple intuition. For any ws ≤ w0
s(wh), the husband makes the
“benevolent transfer” t∗
h = t0
h(wh,ws), which is suﬃcient to induce the wife to fully specialize in
household production. Her wage is low enough to be, in eﬀect, irrelevant and any further reduction
in ws would leave the equilibrium entirely unchanged. Thus, the relationship will remain violence
free.
Consider then the case where ws ∈ (w0
s(wh),w1
s(wh)), implying that the husband chooses the
crowding out transfer t∗
h = t1
h(wh,ws). In this case, the husband is making a transfer which exceeds
the one he would voluntarily make, but the wife is still not working in equilibrium. The husband’s
10equilibrium utility would be increased by a reduction in the wife’s wage as this would allow him to
reduce his transfer towards his benevolent transfer. Thus, he has an economic incentive for abuse.
Finally, consider the case where ws > w1
s(wh) so that, in equilibrium, the wife works and the
husband either makes the “interior” transfer t2
h(wh,ws) or no transfer at all. In this case, the impact




s [  − (1 − 2 )εs (ws,t∗
h)], (12)
and it can be demonstrated that this expression is strictly negative as ws approaches w1
s (wh) from
above (see proof of Proposition 2). This establishes that incentives for violence will also be present










As the wife’s wage increases, her labour supply responsiveness decreases, thus decreasing the right
hand side.10 Instead, for a high enough wife’s wage, his equilibrium utility will be increasing in
her wage as he beneﬁts, through caring, from her higher earnings.
Note that in characterizing the husband’s incentives for abuse, we have ignored any potential
transfer from the wife to the husband. However, it should be clear enough that any transfers from
the wife to the husband will weaken the husband’s abuse incentives as we know from Lemma 1
that the transfer that the wife makes to the husband will be increasing in her wage. Hence by
interfering with her earnings capacity, the husband would also reduce the transfer that he obtains
from her.
Finally, note that economic incentives for instrumental violence obtain from the ineﬃciency in
public good provision associated with incomplete caring. The following result shows that, when
partners behave nearly “completely cooperative”, then they will abstain from domestic violence
altogether:
Proposition 3 (Household Mode of Behavior and Instrumental Violence). In the limit with com-
plete caring,   → 1
2, the set of wages proﬁles ws ∈ (w0
s(wh),w∗
s(wh)) at which the husband has
equilibrium incentives for instrumental violence reduces to the empty set.
While this result is highly intuitive, it is at same time in stark contrast to the insights provided
by exchange theories of domestic violence. Indeed, our framework implies that, with complete
caring, couples pursue a common objective and the household operates on the Pareto frontier. In
this cooperative-like setup, an act of violence which reduces the wife’s earnings capacity would then
simply reduce the utility possibility set and would hence never increase the husband’s equilibrium
utility. In exchange theories, by contrast, acts of violence occur when they increase the utility
possibility set and consequently become part of a Pareto-improving trade (involving compensating
side-payments) between spouses.
3. The Eﬀect of Welfare Policy
Most of the existing theoretical literature on domestic violence does not explicitly model labor
supply and the targeting by abusers of the victim’s economic activities, which explains why it tends
10When the husband is making the interior transfer t
2
h (wh,ws) this eﬀect is further reinforced by this transfer
decreasing in ws.
11to be silent on the consequences of welfare policy. An advantage of our theoretical structure is that
we can get a clear sense of the margins where we may see a change in the incidence of domestic
violence when an outside government intervenes with families. In this section, we thus use our
framework to explore the consequences of welfare policy for the incidence of domestic violence.
Here we will consider two very simple examples of policy interventions: a wage subsidy policy and
a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt policy, with either policy potentially being gender-speciﬁc.
Consider ﬁrst a wage subsidy policy and let σi ≥ 0 denote the subsidy rate that applies to
partner i, i = h,s. The eﬀective wage for partner i is hence e wi ≡ (1 + σi)wi, and we refer to wi
as the individual’s primary wage. We are interested in understanding how a wage subsidy oﬀered
to either gender aﬀects the range of wife’s primary wages at which the husband has economic
incentives.
The analysis of wage subsidies is much simpliﬁed by the insight that what matters for violence
incentives are the partners’ eﬀective wages. This immediately implies that a wage subsidy provided
to women will shift downwards the set of wives’ primary wages at which the husband has violence
incentives. For example, a woman whose primary wage is low enough that she, in the absence of a
wage subsidy, would choose not to work at the husband’s benevolent transfer may ﬁnd that, once
provided with a wage subsidy, she would prefer to work given the same transfer. Hence a wage
subsidy provided to women may pull some low wage women into the violence region. Conversely,
a woman whose primary wage would not be high enough to put her beyond the risk of violence,
may ﬁnd that a positive wage subsidy increases her eﬀective wage enough to do so.
Similarly, since the boundaries of the violence region, w0
s (wh) and w∗
s (wh), are increasing in the
husband’s wage, it follows that a wage subsidy provided to the husband shifts upwards the set of
wives’ primary wages at which the husband has violence incentives. Hence, a wage subsidy provided
to the husband will reduce violence against some low wage women who, with the husband’s subsidy,
will choose not to work at his benevolent transfer. Conversely, by reducing the women’s relative
wage, a wage subsidy provided to males, will put into the violence region some women whose wages
would otherwise have been suﬃciently large to put them beyond the risk of violence.
Proposition 4 (Eﬀect of Wage Subsidies).
1. A wage subsidy given to the husband, σh > 0, increases both the lower- and the upper bound,
w0
s(wh) and w∗
s(wh), of the set of wage proﬁles at which the husband has equilibrium incentives
for instrumental violence.
2. A wage subsidy given to the wife, σs > 0, decreases both the lower- and the upper bound,
w0
s(wh) and w∗
s(wh), of the set of wage proﬁles at which the husband has equilibrium incentives
for instrumental violence.
While the eﬀect of wage subsidies are highly intuitive, the eﬀect of ﬂat-rate beneﬁts are perhaps
somewhat more surprising. So far we have focused on the case where the unearned income for each
partner was zero, yi = 0 (i = h,s). We will now look at how a marginal increase, starting from zero,
in either partner’s unearned income aﬀects the equilibrium in general and violence incentives in
particular, and will refer to this as the eﬀect of an introduction of a gender-speciﬁc ﬂat rate beneﬁt.
A crucial aspect for understanding the impact of ﬂat rate beneﬁts on violence incentives is whether,
in equilibrium, there is a positive transfer from either partner to the spouse. If, in equilibrium,
either partner is making a positive transfer, a local “income pooling property” applies:
Lemma 3 (Income Pooling). If, in equilibrium, partner i is making a positive transfer to the
spouse, t∗
i > 0, then ∂t∗
i/∂yi − ∂t∗
i/∂y−i = 1.
12The key implication of local income pooling is that, locally (i.e. for small variations), only total
household unearned income, yh + ys, matters for the equilibrium outcome. This in turn implies
that the eﬀect of the introduction of a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt is necessarily the same irrespective of which
partner it is given to.
Consider then ﬁrst the eﬀect of the introduction of a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt on the lower bound on the
set of wife’s wages at which the husband has incentives for violence, w0




the husband is making a positive (benevolent) equilibrium transfer (see Proposition
1), and hence there is local income pooling. Moreover, as intuition suggests, providing the husband
with a ﬂat rate beneﬁt will make him increase his benevolent transfer, which in turn will expand
the set of wife’s wages at which she will have no incentive to work, thus raising the lower bound
w0
s (wh) on the violence region. Due to income pooling, the eﬀect of the introduction of a ﬂat rate
beneﬁt provided to the wife is identical.
Consider next the impact of a small ﬂat beneﬁt on the upper bound on the set of wife’s wages
at which the husband has incentives for violence, w∗
s (wh). If w∗
s (wh) < w2
s (wh) then the husband
is making a positive (interior) transfer at the wage proﬁle (wh,w∗
s (wh)) (see Proposition 1), and
hence there is again local income pooling. If the husband is provided with small ﬂat beneﬁt he will
increase his transfer. The indirect eﬀect of this additional unearned income accruing to the wife
is to increase the her labour supply wage responsiveness, which enhances the husband’s violence
incentives, thus increasing w∗
s (wh). From local income pooling, we know that the eﬀect of a ﬂat
rate beneﬁt to the wife is the same. If w∗
s (wh) < w2
s (wh), then the husband is not making any
transfer at the wage proﬁle (wh,w∗
s (wh)). In this case a ﬂat beneﬁt provided to the husband has
no impact on w∗
s (wh). In contrast, a ﬂat beneﬁt provided to the wife directly increases her wage
responsiveness, giving the husband stronger violence incentives, thus again increasing w∗
s (wh).
Proposition 5 (Eﬀect of Flat Rate Beneﬁts).
1. The introduction of a ﬂat rate beneﬁt yi, provided either to the husband or to the wife, equally
strictly increases the lower bound w0
s (wh) of the set of wife’s wages at which the husband has
incentives for violence.
2. If w∗
s (wh) < w2
s (wh), the introduction of a ﬂat rate beneﬁt yi, provided either to the husband
or to the wife, equally strictly increases the upper bound w∗
s (wh) of the set of wife’s wages at
which the husband has incentives for violence
3. If w∗
s (wh) > w2
s (wh), the introduction of a ﬂat rate beneﬁt ys provided to the wife strictly
increases w∗
s (wh) whereas a corresponding ﬂat rate beneﬁt yh provided to the husband has no
eﬀect on w∗
s (wh).
Our results, so far, suggest that welfare policies may shift the incidence of domestic violence
without necessarily reducing it: wage subsidies to women shift the incidence of domestic violence
downwards in the female wage distribution. Conversely, unconditional family cash beneﬁts shift
shift the incidence of domestic violence upwards in the female wage distribution.. Each policy in
isolation may, therefore, have undesirable eﬀects on the risk of violence for some women. These
observations permit us to deduce what type of policy mix would, according to the model, reduce
the incidence of domestic violence. Such a policy mix would require: (1) cash beneﬁts to couples in
the low-wage and low-to-medium wage regime, which would allow males to prevent the ineﬃciency
of non-cooperative equilibrium by means of a benevolent transfer instead of instrumental violence;
and (2) wage subsidies to women in the medium-to-high wage regime, which would reinforce the
13importance of female earnings for the household, and so induce males to abstain from violent
behavior.
4. A Cobb-Douglas Example
In this section we provide a simple Cobb-Douglas example which, in addition to illustrating
the model, allows us to highlight a few more of its features. Hence we let




In this speciﬁcation we include the parameter α > 0 as a measure of the relative importance of the
household produced good.
A feature of the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation (with zero exogenous unearned incomes) is that
the nature of the household equilibrium depends only on the relative wages ws/wh, not on the wage
levels. In particular, maintaining the assumption that yh = ys = 0, the critical wages partitioning
the transfer regimes can all be written in the form
wk
−i (wi) = Ck ( ,α)wi, (15)
with
C0 ( ,α) =
α 
(α + 1)(1 −  )
C1 ( ,α) =
α(α +  )
3α(1 −  ) −   + α2 + 1
C2 ( ,α) =
(α +  )
(1 + α −  )
.
(16)
In a similar way, the upper boundary on the set of wife’s wages at which the husband has incentives
for violence can be written in the form
w∗




As (17) indicates, in the Cobb-Douglas example, the upper bound on the set of wife’s relative wages
at which the husband has incentives for violence wage does not actually depend on   but depends
positively on α. Note that C2 ( ,α) > C∗ (α). Hence in the Cobb-Douglas case, violence always
coexist with positive transfers from the husband to the wife. This result follows from the fact that,
with Cobb-Douglas preferences and with ys = 0, the wife’s labour supply responsiveness, εs (ws,th),
drops to zero when she does not receive a transfer from the husband. Hence the husband cannot
inﬂuence the wife’s labour supply by attacking her wage unless he also make a positive transfer.
Figure 2(a) illustrates how the space of wage-proﬁles is partitioned into regions with diﬀerent
nature/direction of transfers and labour supply status for the case of   = 1/4 and α = 1. At
ws < w0
s (wh) the husband makes the “benevolent” transfer t0
h (wh,ws) and the wife strictly prefers
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(b) Region with incentives for violence





































(b) Transfer and violence regions as a function
of the importance of household production
Figure 3: Comparative statics.
make any transfer to the wife. As, in this example, preferences are symmetric across the two
genders, corresponding regions apply when the wife’s wage exceeds the husbands.
Figure 2(b) illustrates in the same example the set of wage proﬁles at which the husband has
violence incentives. The ﬁgure illustrates how incentives for violence obtain for a set of wage proﬁles
around those where the wife enters the labour market.
The Cobb-Douglas example can also be used to illustrate the impact of caring and of the
relative importance of household produced goods. Figure 3(a) illustrates the three critical relative
wages Ck ( ,α), k = 0,1,2 as well as C∗ (α) as a function of the caring parameter   when α = 1.
The example illustrates how an increase   decreases the set of wage proﬁles (wh,ws) at which the
husband has equilibrium violence incentives. The example also illustrates how the incentives for
violence disappear when   approaches 1/2. In the limit where   = 1/2 the couple has a common
objective and the household operates on the Pareto frontier. An act of violence which reduces ws












(a) A wage subsidy σs > 0 to women shifts the vio-












(b) A ﬂat rate beneﬁt yi > 0 provided to either part-
ner shifts the violence region towards higher-wage
females
Figure 4: Comparative statics.
equilibrium utility.
Figure 3(b) illustrates the same critical relative wage functions, now as a function of α given
  = 1/4. This ﬁgure highlights how an increase in the relative importance of household production,
as parameterized by α, tends to increase the incentives for violence. This reﬂects how, in the
current model, violence obtains as a result of disagreements between the two partners regarding
the allocation of time in the presence of household production: if the importance of household
produced goods diminish, so do the incentives for violence.
Above we outlined some general results regarding the eﬀect of wage subsidies and ﬂat-rate bene-
ﬁts on the incidence of instrumental violence. In line with the result that only relative wages matter
in the Cobb-Douglas, it is only the relative subsidy rate that matters for violence incentives.11
Figure 4(a) illustrates the eﬀect of a 50 percent relative subsidy to women (σs = 1/2, σh = 0).
A corresponding relative wage subsidy to men would shift the violence region in the opposite
direction.
Figure 4(b) illustrates the eﬀect of a small ﬂat rate beneﬁt. Noting that w∗
s (wh) < w2
s (wh)
holds in the Cobb-Douglas case, it follows that the eﬀect of the introduction of a ﬂat rate beneﬁt
is the same irrespective of to which partner it is provided.12 In line with Proposition 5 the ﬁgure
illustrates how a small beneﬁt yi > 0 (provided to either partner) shifts the violence region upwards.
11In particular in the presence of wage subsidies σh and σs, each of the critical relative wages in (16) and (17) are
rescaled by a factor (1 + σh)/(1 + σs).
12It should be noted that the analysis above was for the case case of yi = 0 in order to ensure that someone in the
household always chooses to work in equilibrium and to ensure that a partner’s benevolent transfer to the spouse will
be positive. It was for the same reason that the claims in Proposition 5 focused on the introduction of a “small” ﬂat
beneﬁt starting from zero unearned income, that is, the derivatives of the equilibrium with respect to yi taken at the
point where yi = 0. Figure 4b is drawn from a small strictly positive amount of unearned income, but ignores the
possibility of both partners not working and of a zero benevolent transfers. Hence the ﬁgure should be considered
only as illustrative and it should be recognized that it is not entirely complete for couples with wage proﬁles where
one or both partners have very low wages.
165. Discussion and Conclusion
We have proposed a theoretical framework which revolves around the notion of domestic vio-
lence being instrumental and directly related towards women’s economic activity. At the heart of
the proposed model is an intra-household disagreement about the allocation of time between mar-
ket work and home production. We have shown that this mechanism generates a non-monotonic
relationship between the gender wage gap and the incidence of domestic violence. With a low rela-
tive wage, it is individually rational for a woman—being supported ﬁnancially by her partner—to
fully specialize at home. The woman’s chosen allocation of time coincides with her partner’s pre-
ferred choice, and the relationship stays violence free. With an intermediate relative wage, it is
privately rational for a woman to look for work and enter employment (at the level of ﬁnancial
support that her husband would voluntarily provide her with), but the husband’s preferred choice
is for her to stay specialized in household production. While he will increase his ﬁnancial support
in order to induce her not to enter the labour force, he also has an incentive to directly target her
labour market opportunities and hence resorts to violence. Finally, with a high relative wage, a
woman’s earned income is too important for a male partner to interfere with her earnings capacity.
Overall, therefore, our model predicts that domestic violence is associated with a woman’s labor
supply being contentious and economic roles in the family hanging in the balance. This result has
an important implication for the impact of employment on domestic violence as well: women who
are not working at all do not necessarily face a higher risk domestic violence than those engaged in
paid employment. Quite to the contrary, female participation in the labor force may be a trigger
for instrumental partner violence.
In addition to providing a novel explanation for domestic violence, our analysis also serves to
highlight some policy dilemmas. Speciﬁcally, our results suggest that policies aimed at improving
the economic situation of families may shift the incidence of domestic violence without necessarily
reducing it. For example, unconditional family cash beneﬁts shift the incidence of violence upwards
in the female wage distribution, while wages subsidies to women may have the opposite eﬀect. In
order to reduce domestic violence, therefore, diﬀerent types of households have to be targeted with
diﬀerent types of policy measures. This underlines the complexities policy makers have to negotiate
when facing the problem of domestic violence.
It is important to acknowledge that this paper is a purely theoretical exercise. In general, we
know precious little about the empirical importance of the channels identiﬁed by our theory. Recent
empirical research has examined the basic prediction of economic exchange theories of domestic
violence, namely that the risk of domestic violence against women decreases with women’s relative
wages. Exploiting exogenous changes in the demand for labor in female-dominated industries,
Aizer (2010) provides support for a negative causal relationship between the female-male wage
gap and domestic violence. Her ﬁndings are entirely consistent with the current theoretical model.
However, Aizer’s analysis focuses on local average eﬀects and so may be missing potentially non-
monotonic eﬀects of the gender wage gap on domestic violence. Our framework puts forward
the empirical hypothesis that the risk of domestic violence is inversely U-shaped in the female-
male wage gap at the level of the household. Turning to the association between employment
and domestic violence, the empirical evidence is mixed (Tauchen and Witte, 1995; Macmillan and
Gartner, 1999; Rodriguez et al., 2001; Gibson et al., 2005). However, it is interesting to note that,
in developing countries, women in paid employment are frequently more likely to be subjected to
domestic violence than those who are not in the labor force. For example, 27 percent of working
women in India report ever having experienced domestic violence, compared with less than 15
17percent of those who do not work (Kishor and Johnson, 2004, p. 28, Table 3.1.1). Likewise, in
Peru, roughly 46 percent of women engaged in paid employment report ever having experienced
domestic violence, while 36 percent of nonworking women report same. Similar observations can
also be made in several other Latin American countries. While these empirical patterns cannot be
easily explained with a model of household bargaining that incorporates preference-based violence,
they are consistent with the notion of domestic violence being instrumental and directly related to
women’s labor market activity.
There are several directions in which our analysis could be expanded. From a theoretical
perspective, it would be interesting to embed the present framework in a model where women have
the option of quitting abusive relationships and use the unifying model to examine how the internal
organization of the family and outside options interact in shaping the incidence of domestic violence.
From an empirical perspective, it would be interesting to use survey data on domestic violence to
deduce some of the key parameters of our model and to generate quantitative predictions from the
estimated parameter values. This would allow us to get a feel for the empirical relevance of the
non-monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and the incidence of abuse as predicted
by the theory. These and other issues are important and challenging topics for future research.
In the meantime, our analysis demonstrates the need to go beyond preference-based bargaining
models of domestic violence and to incorporate instrumental incentives into economic explanations
of spousal violence against women.
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19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition is proven through a series of lemmas. First, deﬁne the “benevolent”
transfer, t0
i (wi,w−i), from partner i to −i implicitly as the solution to the following equation:


















Lemma A.1. The benevolent transfer t0
i (wi,w−i) is (i) a uniquely identiﬁed continuous function with
t0
i (wi,w−i) ∈ (0,wi), (ii) strictly increasing in wi and independent of w−i.
Proof. Both sides of (A1) are continuous functions of ti. Using (9) it follows that the left hand side is
strictly increasing in ti. The right hand side is strictly decreasing in ti. Moreover, as ti approaches either 0
the right hand side approaches inﬁnity whereas if ti approaches wi, the left hand side approaches inﬁnity.
Hence (A1) must have a unique solution in the interval (0,wi). The eﬀect of an increase in wi follows from
the fact that ∂mi/∂wi > 0. Independence of w−i follows from the fact that it does not feature directly in
(A1).
Next, deﬁne the “crowding out” transfer, t1
i (wi,w−i), from partner i to −i implicitly as the transfer at












(1 −  )
. (A2)
Lemma A.2. The crowding out transfer t1
i (wi,w−i) is (i) a uniquely identiﬁed continuous function, (ii)
strictly increasing in w−i, independent of wi,(iii) approaches 0 as w−i approaches 0.
Proof. Uniqueness and continuity follow immediately from diﬀerentiability and strict concavity of v−i ( ).
Monotonicity in w−i follows from strict concavity of v−i ( ). Independence of wi follows from the fact that
wi does not feature directly in (A2). Finally, note that as w−i → 0+, any positive transfer will strictly
induce −i not to work. Hence t1
i (wi,w−i) (which is the smallest transfer at which −i chooses not to work)
must approach zero.
For large enough w−i, the crowding out transfer will not be “aﬀordable” to i. Hence we implicitly deﬁne
wmax








From the properties of t1
i (wi,w−i) in Lemma A.2 it follows that wmax
−i (wi) is uniquely identiﬁed and strictly
increasing in wi.
We next deﬁne w0














Lemma A.3. The critical wage w0
−i (wi) is a uniquely identiﬁed continuous and strictly increasing function
of wi, and w−i < (>)w0
−i (wi) implies t0
i (wi,w−i) > (<)t1
i (wi,w−i).
Proof. Immediate from the properties of t0
i (wi,w−i)and t1
i (wi,w−i) given in Lemma A.1 and A.2.
In order to analyze the transfer decision it is useful to write −i’s utility as a (continuous) function of ti
in the following way




mi (wi,yi − ti)
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20remembering that for any ti ≥ t1
i (wi,w−i) the recipient, −i, chooses zero labor supply. We can now establish
strict concavity of −i’s utility in ti.
Lemma A.4. Ui (ti;wi,w−i) is strictly a strictly concave function of ti with a “downward kink” at ti =
t1
i (wi,w−i).
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (A5) with respect to ti and evaluating at some ti < t1




= −(1 −  )v′
i (ci) + v′
−i (c−i)
￿





When evaluating at some ti > t1
i (wi,w−i), the same expression holds but with ∂m−i/∂Y−i = 0 as −i strictly
prefers not to work at such a transfer. At ti = t1
i (wi,w−i), the derivative (A6) does not exist. However,
the left and the right derivatives both exist and are given by (A6), with and without the ∂m−i/∂Y−i term
included respectively. Since ∂m−i/∂Y−i < 0 (see eq. (9)), the left derivative exceeds the right derivative.





























When evaluating at some ti > t1
i (wi,w−i), the same expression holds but with ∂m−i/∂Y−i = 0 etc. It
follows from (9) and Assumption 3, that (A7) is strictly negative at any ti  = t1
i (wi,w−i).
From Lemma A.4 it follows that i’s optimal transfer (if positive) is either characterized by ti  =
t1
i (wi,w−i) and (A6) being equal to zero, or by ti = t1
i (wi,w−i) and (A6) being strictly positive at all
ti < t1
i (wi,w−i) and strictly negative at all ti > t1
i (wi,w−i)). For future reference it is also useful to note


















where the inequality follows from Assumption 3. When evaluated at some ti > t1
i (wi,w−i) the expression
in (A8) is identically equal to zero as −i then strictly prefer to not work. Note also that
∂2Ui (ti;wi,w−i)
∂ti∂wi





Lemma A.5. At w−i ≤ w0
−i (wi), i’s optimal transfer is the benevolent transfer t0
i (wi,w−i).
Proof. Suppose that w−i ≤ w0
−i (wi) and i chooses ti = t0
i (wi,w−i). Since t0
i (wi,w−i) ≥ t1
i (wi,w−i) (see
Lemma A.3), it follows from the deﬁnition of the benevolent transfer in (A1) that ∂Ui/∂ti given by (A6)
equals zero at this transfer, thus conﬁrming that it is an optimal choice for i.
Next we deﬁne implicitly a second critical recipient’s wage. To this end, consider the left derivative of











where we note that the left derivative is given by (A6) with the inclusion of the ∂m−i/∂Y−i term. The
second critical wage, denoted w1
−i (wi), is implicitly deﬁned as the w−i at which (A10) equals zero.
21Lemma A.6. The critical wage w1
−i (wi) (i) is a uniquely identiﬁed continuous and strictly increasing
function of wi, and (ii) is strictly larger than w0
−i (wi).
Proof. Evaluating at w−i ≤ w0
−i (wi), and using that, at any such recipient’s wage, t1
i (wi,w−i) ≤ t0
i (wi,w−i),
one can easily verify that the left hand side of (A10) is positive. For large enough w−i, (A10) will, on the
other hand, be negative. To see this, note that when w−i approaches wmax
−i (wi), t1
i (wi,w−i) approaches wi,
implying that i’s consumption approaches zero. Given continuity of the left hand side of (A10) in w−i at
least one solution to the equation in (A10) exists, and any solution strictly exceeds w0
−i (wi).
To demonstrate uniqueness of w1
−i (wi), note that (A10) is strictly decreasing in w−i both directly (see
eq. A8), and indirectly via t1
i (wi,w−i) being increasing in w−i (Lemma A.2) and concavity of Ui in ti
(Lemma A.4). Finally, that w1
−i (wi) is increasing in wi follows from simple comparative statics using (A9)
and recalling that t1
i (wi,w−i) is independent of wi (Lemma A.2)






, i’s optimal transfer is the crowding-out transfer t1
i (wi,w−i).






we now have that the right derivative of Ui (ti;wi,w−i) with respect
to ti evaluated at ti = t1
i (wi,w−i) is strictly negative (since, for such w−i, t1
i (wi,w−i) > t0
i (wi,w−i)) while
the left derivative is strictly positive. Hence, by global concavity of Ui (ti;wi,w−i) in ti (Lemma A.4) it
follows that t1
i (wi,w−i) is i’s optimal transfer.
We deﬁne a third critical recipient’s wage, denoted w2
−i (wi), as the smallest w−i at which i chooses to
make a zero transfer. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne w2








Lemma A.8. The critical wage w2
−i (wi) (i) is a uniquely identiﬁed continuous and strictly increasing
function of wi, and (ii) is strictly larger than w1
−i (wi).
Proof. From Lemmas A.5 and A.7, we know that for any w−i ≤ w1
−i (wi), i’s optimal transfer is either
t1
i (wi,w−i) or, if w−i ≤ w0
−i (wi), t0
i (wi,w−i) which then exceeds t1
i (wi,w−i). Hence for any w−i ≤
w1
−i (wi), i’s optimal transfer is strictly positive, implying that ∂Ui(0;wi,w−i)/∂ti is strictly positive at any
such w−i. Next we note that ∂Ui (0;wi,w−i)/∂ti is strictly decreasing in w−i as −i’s earnings are increasing
in w−i and due to Assumption 3 (and, under natural conditions, for large enough w−i the derivative becomes
negative). This demonstrates that w2
−i (wi) is unique and exceeds w1
−i (wi). That w2
−i (wi) increases in wi
follows from (A9).














and is strictly increasing in wi and strictly decreasing in w−i. At
w−i ≥ w2
−i (wi), i’s optimal transfer is the zero transfer.
Proof. For w−i > w1
−i(wi), the left derivative of Ui (ti;wi,w−i) with respect to ti evaluated at ti =
t1
i (wi,w−i) is strictly negative, implying that i’s optimal transfer is given by some ti < t1
i (wi,w−i) (at
which the recipient works some positive amount of time). The optimal transfer in this case is either strictly
positive and characterized by the derivative in (A6) being equal to zero, or equal to zero with the derivative
in (A6) being non-positive at ti = 0. Per deﬁnition, w2
−i (wi) is the unique recipient’s wage above which
the derivative of Ui (ti;wi,w−i) with respect to ti evaluated at ti = 0 is negative. We denote the strictly







i (wi,w−i). Monotonicity of t2
i (wi,w−i) in wi and
w−i then follows immediately from (A8) and (A9).
Proposition 1 follows in a straightforward manner, using Lemmas A.1 to A.9.
22Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that, in equilibrium, partner i is making a positive transfer to partner −i. It
then follows that
(1 −  )v
′









To see this, note that if i makes an interior transfer t2
i (wi,w−i) to −i, then (A12) holds with equality as it
is the ﬁrst order condition characterizing the interior transfer. If i makes a benevolent transfer t0
i (wi,w−i)
to −i, then (A12) holds with equality, but with ∂m−i/∂Y−i = 0 as −i strictly prefers not to work. Finally,
if i is making the crowding out transfer t1
i (wi,w−i) to −i, then (A12) holds with inequality as the left
derivative of Ui with respect ti at t1
i (wi,w−i) is positive (see proof of Proposition 1). If partner −i is then
also making a positive transfer to i, the same inequality with i and −i interchanged also holds. Combining
the two inequalities to eliminate the marginal utilities yields that
(1 −  )
2 ≤
￿
















(−1,0) × (−1,0), in the open interval
￿




Proof of Proposition 2. Let U∗
i (wi,w−i) denote the equilibrium utility of partner i. At any ws ≤ w0
s (wh),
the husband makes the “benevolent transfer” t0
h (wh,ws) which is independent of ws, and the wife strictly
prefers not to work in equilibrium. A marginal reduction ws does not aﬀect any aspect of the equilibrium,
and hence, in particular, does not increase the husband’s equilibrium utility U∗
h (wh,ws).






the husband chooses the “crowding-out transfer” t1
h (wh,ws) and, in




= −[(1 −  )v′
h (c∗







where the sign follows from the fact that, as ws > w0
s (wh), t1
h (wh,ws) > t0
h (wh,ws) (see Lemma A.3),
implying that the term in brackets is positive.






the husband chooses the “interior transfer” t2
h (wh,ws) and, in
equilibrium, the wife is working some positive amount of time in the labour market. At such a ws it can be

























s) in the ﬁnal term using the ﬁrst order condition for the wife’s labour supply and







s {  − (1 − 2 )εs (ws,ys + t∗
h)}. (A16)
It should be noted that the husband’s incentives for violence are “smooth” at ws = w1
s (wh): taking the
limit of (A14) as ws → w1
s (wh)
− and the limit of (A16) as ws → w1
s (wh)





















Thus the husband’s incentives for violence extend to some ws at which the wife works in equilibrium.
23Moreover, equation (A16) holds also at any ws ≥ w2
s (wh), at which the husband makes no transfer to the
wife and the wife works in equilibrium.
From (A16) it follows that, for ws > w1
s (wh), the husband has equilibrium incentives for violence until
 









Note, by Assumption 3.2, εs directly decreases in ws and increases in Ys. Moreover, as ws > w1
s (wh), the
husband is either making the interior transfer t2
h (wh,ws), which by Lemma A.9 is decreasing in ws, or a zero
transfer. If the husband is making the interior transfer, then an increase in ws further leads to a reduction
in εs through the reduction in the wife’s total unearned income. Hence the right hand side of (A18) is a
decreasing function of ws, implying that if, given wh, it ﬁrst fails at some w∗
s (wh) > w1




Finally, to see that w∗
s (wh) weakly increases in wh, note that wh only enters (A18) via the husband’s
interior transfer. If w∗
s (wh) > w2
s (wh), then the husband is making zero transfer at ws = w∗
s (wh) in which
case marginal variations in wh has no impact on the critical wage w∗







the husband is making a positive transfer at ws = w∗
s (wh) which, by Lemma A.9, is increasing in wh. A
marginal increase in wh then increases Ys via the husband’s equilibrium transfer, and thus increases εs and
w∗
s (wh).






[vh (ch) + vs (cs)] + z (1 − ℓh,1 − ℓs)|ch + cs = whℓh + wsℓs + yh + ys
￿
(A19)
the ﬁrst order conditions for which imply
v′





i (ci) ≤ z′
i (1 − ℓi) (A21)
where the latter condition holds with equality when ℓi > 0. The solution to the above problem has a
“reservation wage property”. In particular, the wife does not work at the solution to (A19) if and only if
ws ≤ wr
s (wh) for some wr
s (wh).
The non-cooperative equilibrium in the limiting case where   → 1/2 corresponds to the solution to
(A19). Note in particular, that the characterization of both the “benevolent” transfer and the “interior”
transfer reduce to the “equalized marginal utility” condition (A20), and the labour supply condition (A21)
corresponds to the limit of (6). (As will be clear shortly, in the limit, “crowding out” transfers will not
occur). Recalling that w0
s (wh) is deﬁned as the highest ws wage at which the wife chooses not to work at
the husband’s benevolent transfer, it follows that w0
s (wh) → wr
s (wh) as   → 1/2. Consider then w∗
s (wh)
deﬁned as the highest wife’s wage at which ∂U∗
h/∂ws given in (A16) is strictly negative. Note however that,




s/2 which is thus positive for any ws at which the wife is
working. Hence it follows that w∗
s (wh) → wr







reduces to the empty set as as   → 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Extend the notation to include the subsidy rates σi,i = h,s in the notation for the
lower and upper bound on the interval of wife’s wages at which the husband has equilibrium incentives for
violence, w0
s (wh;σh,σs) and w∗
s (wh;σh,σs). What matters for the equilibrium outcome are the partners’









s (wh (1 + σh),0,0)
(1 + σs)
. (A22)
24It immediately follows that both critical wages are decreasing in σs. To see that both critical wages are also
increasing in σh recall that both w0
s (wh) and w∗
s (wh) are increasing in wh (see Lemma A.3 and Proposition
2).
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall that Yi ≡ yi − ti + t−i denotes i’s total unearned income (inclusive of transfers).
If partner i is making an equilibrium transfer t∗
i > 0 to −i (implying that t∗
−i = 0, see Lemma 2), then
individual i is eﬀectively choosing, on the margin, the intra-household allocation of total unearned income
subject to Yi + Y−i = yi + y−i. As yi and y−i only feature in the form of their sum it follows that
∂Y ∗
i /∂yi = ∂Y ∗
i /∂y−i, or equivalently, 1 − ∂t∗
i/∂yi = −∂t∗
i/∂y−i. Note that this holds irrespective of
whether i’s transfer is “benevolent”, “crowding-out”, or “interior”.
Proof of Proposition 5. Using the deﬁnition of w0
s (wh) in (A4) and diﬀerentiating with respect to unearned























When k = h, the ﬁrst term on the left hand side and the second term on the right hand side are, by










where the sign follows from simple comparative statics which shows that t0
h (wh,ws) strictly increases in yh
and, from Proposition 1. By local income pooling, ∂w0
s (wh)/∂ys = ∂w0
s (wh)/∂yh.
When w∗
s (wh) < w2
s (wh) the upper bound w∗
s (wh) is implicitly deﬁned by (A18). Diﬀerentiating with
















where we note that the denominator is strictly negative by Assumption 3 and Proposition 1, and simple
comparative statics show that the numerator is strictly positive. By local income pooling the introduction
of yh must have the same positive eﬀect on w∗
s as ys.
When w∗
s (wh) > w2
s (wh) equation (A18) reduces to  /(1 −  ) = εs (w∗
s (ws),ys). As yh does not
feature in this equation it immediately follows that a (small) yh has no impact on w∗
s (wh). Moreover, by
Assumption 3 the labour supply elasticity is decreasing in the own wage and increasing in unearned income,
which together imply that w∗
s (wh) increases in ys.
25